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1. OVERVIEW
The pace of the recovery in the Spanish economy dating back to mid-2013 increased in 
2015. Despite lower global growth and the cyclical weakness of the euro area, the headway 
in restoring the main macrofinancial equilibria, the successive reductions in oil prices, the 
stepping up of monetary policy stimuli and the expansionary fiscal policy stance all helped 
quicken the growth rate from 1.4% in 2014 to 3.2% in 2015, a figure appreciably higher 
than that posted by Spain’s main European partners. 
Household consumption, business investment and exports were the demand components 
that most contributed to the growth in activity. A further factor, in contrast to previous 
years, was the expansion in consumption and public investment. Employment creation 
remained notably intense, as evidenced by the increase of over half a million in workers 
employed. Households and firms (financial and non-financial alike) continued to pursue 
the deleveraging process they initiated some years ago and, overall, they generated net 
lending above the financial requirements of the public sector, meaning that the external 
financial surplus of the nation as a whole stood at slightly over 2% of GDP. The budget 
deficit declined to 5.1% of GDP as a result solely of the improvement in activity, as there 
was an increase in the structural budget deficit (that which is not adjusted for economic 
developments) to 2.9% of GDP, on European Commission (EC) estimates. The public debt/
GDP ratio stood at 99.2% of GDP (99.3% in 2014).
The expansionary fiscal policy stance combined last year with other factors whose positive 
effects on growth are expected likewise to be temporary. These included the successive 
reductions in oil and other commodities prices, the depreciation of the euro for much of 
the year and the easing in financing costs. In this respect, as the impulse from these 
factors progressively tapers off, the Spanish economy will grow at a more moderate rate, 
as the latest Banco de España forecasts show. 
The current recovery phase is proving conducive to helping restore the main 
macrofinancial equilibria of the Spanish economy which, in turn, have a positive bearing 
on growth capacity. Improvements have been most visible in the fields of employment, 
competitiveness, private-sector deleveraging and the stabilisation and incipient 
recovery of the real estate sector, along with the clean-up and restructuring of the 
financial sector. Yet significant challenges remain, including most notably the need to 
reduce high unemployment, to see through the process of private-sector deleveraging 
and to resume a fiscal consolidation path consistent with a sustained reduction in 
public debt. And this in a setting in which high external debt and the corresponding 
sizeable refinancing needs continue to be a factor of vulnerability. For the medium-term 
outlook to improve, there is a need to boost productivity, the sluggishness of which 
curtails growth possibilities, and to tackle the effects of population ageing. These 
challenges call for a resolute economic policy agenda in terms both of fiscal consolidation 
and of structural reform. 
This first chapter analyses the international and domestic factors underpinning growth last 
year. It also highlights the main challenges facing the Spanish economy and the economic 
policies needed to tackle them. The remaining chapters in this Report address specific 
aspects in greater depth, such as those relating to the determinants of the gains in 
competitiveness observed in recent years and their influence on the current recovery 
1 Introduction
The pace of recovery in the 
Spanish economy increased  
in 2015, attaining growth  
of 3.2 %...
…providing for a sharp 
increase in employment and 
an improved external surplus, 
although the structural budget 
deficit worsened 
The progressive tailing off of 
certain factors that have 
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output in 2015 will make way 
for more moderate growth rates 
in the short and medium term 
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phase (Chapter 2), the effects of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policies on the Spanish 
economy (Chapter 3) and the significance of business dynamism and its impact on 
productivity (Chapter 4). 
In 2015 the world economy grew by 3.1%, 0.3 pp down on 2014 (see panel 1 of Chart 1.1) 
and also down on expectations at the start of the year. The slowdown in activity was the 
result of the diminished dynamism of the emerging economies, whose growth fell, for the 
fifth year running, to 4% from 4.6% in 2014. The advanced economies maintained a 
modest rate of increase (1.9% against 1.8% the previous year), despite the expansionary 
stance of economic policies (monetary policy in particular) and the fresh declines in oil 
prices. The behaviour of the world economy was influenced mainly by three developments: 
the re-balancing of the Chinese economy, the acceleration of the fall in oil prices and 
expectations about the normalisation of US monetary policy. 
The Chinese economy remains immersed in a transition towards a more sustainable 
growth model, with a greater prevalence of consumption over investment and exports, and 
of services over industry, and in which the markets play a more significant role in resource 
allocation (see panel 2 of Chart 1.1). Since summer 2015, the complexity of the process 
and the doubts about its future course have given rise to increased uncertainty globally, 
with adverse consequence for trade flows and international financial markets. 
2  Economic 
developments in 2015 
2.1  AN UNCERTAIN GLOBAL 
SETTING 
The growth of the emerging 
economies slowed …
… in a setting of uncertainty 
over the re-balancing of the 
Chinese economy…
SOURCES: IMF and Datastream.
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Oil prices continued falling in 2015, albeit with a degree of volatility over the course of the 
year. The price of a barrel of Brent fell below $30 in early 2016, marking a low since 2003. 
Subsequently, however, it rebounded to around $50 per barrel (see panel 3 of Chart 1.1). 
Nonetheless, the global impact of cheaper oil prices is proving less favourable than 
anticipated, as a result of their adverse effect on investment in the extraction industries, 
the deterioration in the financial position of energy companies and the fiscal and external 
situation of the oil-exporting economies. 
Uncertainty over the Chinese economy and other emerging areas and the fall in oil prices 
were two of the main triggers of the turbulence on global financial markets during the 
second half of 2015 and in the opening months of the current year (see panel 4 of Chart 
1.1). Against this background, the dollar appreciated against the benchmark currencies 
and, above all, relative to those of the emerging economies, owing to its safe-haven status 
and to the divergence in monetary policy cycles across the different regions. The high 
volatility on international financial markets in late 2015 and early 2016, and the limited 
prospects of global growth, however, contributed to tempering the pace of normalisation 
of the US monetary policy stance, which began last December with the first rate rise in 
seven years by the Federal Reserve. 
… and downward pressures 
on oil prices
There was high volatility on 
financial markets in the 
second half of 2015 and in 
early 2016 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE, European Commission and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rate of change calculated on the basis of seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP, and CPI original series.
b Defined as the percentage difference between actual GDP and potential GDP. European Commission estimate and projections (broken line) (May 2016).
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Euro area GDP grew by 1.5% in 2015, against 0.9% the previous year (see panel 1 of Chart 
1.2). The increase in GDP was largely underpinned by household consumption, as a result 
of more favourable financial conditions and the increase in disposable income, in a setting 
of low inflation rates and improving labour market conditions. Government consumption 
also contributed positively to growth, boosted in some countries by the increased 
expenditure needed to address the refugee crisis, whereas investment remained sluggish. 
Despite the improvement, the pace of recovery in the area remained modest, as compared 
with previous episodes of recovery and in relation to the recent experience of other 
advanced economies. Since late 2015, the context of lower global growth and greater 
uncertainty appears to have been contributing to moderating growth prospects, as may be 
inferred from the projections published last May by the EC, which revised the increase in 
GDP to 1.6% and 1.8%, respectively, for 2016 and 2017. 
One of the highlights of the recent euro area performance is the relatively favourable 
behaviour of employment, which grew 1.1% in 2015 as a whole, partly driven by the effect 
of the structural reforms recently undertaken by certain economies in the area. However, 
job creation is not yet of a sufficient intensity to significantly reduce the high unemployment 
rates still besetting certain countries. More generally, European labour markets must face 
the challenges posed by structural unemployment, population ageing and the absorption 
of migratory flows. 
Inflation was dominated by the strong adjustment in oil and other commodity prices, which 
led the level of prices to hold practically unchanged over the year as a whole, in step with 
developments in other advanced economies. Temporary fluctuations aside, however, core 
inflation hovered at rates below 1% throughout 2015 and in early 2016, influenced by the 
still-wide negative output gap. Indicators of medium- and long-term inflation expectations 
continue to slip downwards (see Chart 1.2).
As explained in detail in Chapter 3 of this Report, the build-up of downside risks to the 
price stability objective and the growing signs of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations 
led the ECB to extend its asset purchase programme in early 2015, with secondary 
market acquisitions of securities issued by the public sector. This measure, along with 
others previously adopted, such as the setting of negative interest rates on the deposit 
facility and on targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTROs), favourably impacted 
the financing costs of public and private agents alike in the euro area, reducing the levels 
of financial fragmentation and providing for greater dynamism in the flow of credit. The 
depreciation of the euro in the opening months of the year had a positive effect on 
European exports, the relative weight of which on international markets duly increased 
considerably.
After the summer, however, the worsening global growth outlook and the increased 
volatility on financial markets impacted financial conditions in the area. And this, combined 
with the appreciation of the euro against the benchmark currencies as from that point, 
partly offset the positive effect of the monetary stimuli. In response to the new scenario, 
the ECB Governing Council approved further stimulus measures in December 2015 and in 
March 2016. The monetary authority cut the rate on the deposit facility on two occasions, 
lowering it to -0.40%, while the rates on the main refinancing operations and on the 
marginal lending facility stood at 0% and 0.25%, respectively. The Council further decided 
to expand its asset purchase programme and to introduce a new series of TLTROs in order 
to strengthen monetary policy transmission through the credit channel. 
2.2  THE EURO AREA AND THE 
MONETARY POLICY OF THE 
ECB 
The euro area economy grew 
moderately, driven by 
consumption…
… and the growth outlook has 
recently been revised 
downwards 
The pace of employment 
creation, while sustained, is 
still insufficient for significantly 
reducing the high 
unemployment still persisting 
in some countries
Prices remained flat, in a 
setting of low inflation 
expectations 
The monetary policy measures 
deployed since mid-2014 had 
a favourable impact on 
financial conditions in the area 
The ECB approved further 
stimulus measures in 
December 2015 and in March 
2016 in response to the 
worsening inflation outlook 
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The European institutions agreed on a third financial assistance programme for Greece, 
against the background of the growing vulnerability of the Greek economy which prompted 
the setting of capital controls. Following the approval of the programme in July last year, 
there was a third round of recapitalisation of Greek financial institutions and an extensive 
list of measures – upon which the continuity of the programme and the potential adoption 
of debt-relief measures are conditional – began to be implemented. 
After the start-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2014, further steps were taken 
throughout 2015 and earlier this year to complete the Banking Union. Thus, the creation of 
the Single Resolution Mechanism and the entry into force of the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive will enable situations of non-viability of credit institutions to be tackled 
using common principles and rules, minimising the economic cost and the need for public 
funds. Likewise, the Single Resolution Fund, which draws on contributions from banks 
themselves, has been in place since January 2016 to finance possible resolution measures. 
Finally, the EC published its proposal regarding the third pillar of the Banking Union, 
namely the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, which contemplates 
a progressive integration process that should be finalised within eight years. 
The Spanish economy continued on a path of recovery in 2015, posting a year-on-year 
rate of increase of 3.5% in the final quarter of the year, the highest figure since the current 
expansionary phase began almost 3 years ago (see Chart 1.2 and Table 1.1). Growth was 
driven by a broad set of factors, some structural in nature and others more temporary. 
 
The structural factors relate to the continuation of the still-incomplete adjustment of the 
main imbalances built up during the previous upturn and the most severe phases of the 
crisis, and to the improvement in the macrofinancial setting, to which the policies and 
reforms implemented both domestically and at the European level contributed. In particular, 
a key element of recent developments is the ongoing improvement in the competitiveness 
of the Spanish economy derived from the adjustment of relative prices and costs of goods 
and services. And the correction of a significant portion of the financial fragmentation 
problems within the euro area and the improved financing conditions for our economy’s 
public and private sectors have also been instrumental in this connection. Further, 
throughout last year, patent headway was once again made in the deleveraging of 
households and firms. 
The competitive adjustment is estimated to have operated, firstly, by invigorating exports. 
This, in turn, will have fed through to the domestic spending and employment components, 
enabling the unemployment rate to be cut considerably, although it remains at a very high 
level. In turn, the dynamics of employment creation discernible throughout the current 
phase of recovery have been a significant source of support for demand, in terms both of 
sustaining household disposable income and improving confidence. These developments 
are expected to have helped entrench the net lending capacity of the nation vis-à-vis the 
external sector, as is analysed in Chapter 2 of this Report. 
Notable among the more temporary factors, given their significance for economic activity 
and prices, were the new monetary measures. These entailed a further improvement in 
financial conditions and a depreciation of the euro, the expansionary fiscal policy stance, 
the fall in oil and other commodities prices, and, in the opposite direction, the slowdown 
At the institutional level, it was 
agreed to approve a third 
assistance programme for 
Greece …
… and there was further 
progress aimed at completing 
the Banking Union 
2.3  THE CONTINUATION OF THE 
RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH 
ECONOMY 
The Spanish economy was 
boosted by several factors, 
some more permanent and 
others temporary 
Notable among the structural 
factors was the improvement 
in the macrofinancial setting…
... while the temporary factors 
included the fall in oil prices, 
the depreciation of the euro 
and demand-side policies 
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SOURCES: INE, IGAE, AMECO and Banco de España.
a Spanish National Accounts data, base year 2010.
b Volume indices. Rate of change.
c Rate of change, except the unemployment rate, which is a level.
d Employment rate (16-64).
e Levels as a percentage of GDP.
f Annual average levels for the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, interest rates and exchange rates, and rates of change for finanancial assets and liabilities.
g 1999 Q1 = 100.
h 1999 Q1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
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in world goods and services markets. Box 1.1 offers a quantification of these effects for 
2015 in the Spanish economy, which, overall, accounted for around 1.1 pp of additional 
growth and a 1.6 pp decline in inflation. 
Among the national demand components (see Table 1.1 and Chart 1.3), household 
spending growth averaged 3.1% in 2015, compared with 1.2% the previous year, 
assisted by an improvement in its main determinants. Real disposable income thus rose 
thanks to the increase in labour income, fiscal stimuli and the fall in oil prices. Adding to 
the improvement in household spending capacity was a higher level of financial and of 
real estate wealth, which reflected the turnaround in the housing market and a further 
reduction in the saving ratio, which fell to 9.3% of disposable income. Business 
investment was also markedly dynamic, growing at a rate of 6.5% against 0.9% in 2014, 
in step with the brighter economic outlook, the pick-up in business profits and the 
greater degree of looseness in financing conditions. In general government consumption 
spending there was a break in the restrictiveness of recent years; this variable grew by 
2.7% in 2015 (set against a zero change in 2014), up on the initial official plans for the 
year. The increase in net public sector employment creation, following several years of 
freezes or restrictions, and higher general government purchases appear to lie behind 
this upward trend in government consumption. Finally, public investment increased by 
9% in nominal terms, once a set of temporary factors1 due principally to the investment 
activity of the regional governments is stripped out, providing for the first positive figure 
since 2010.
Net exports once again contributed negatively to the increase in GDP in 2015, by 0.5 pp 
(see Chart 1.3). Real exports increased by 5.4% (5.1% in 2014), given that the impact of 
the gains in competitiveness, derived above all from the nominal depreciation of the euro, 
exceeded that of the lower growth of export markets. This competitiveness effect 
progressively lost momentum in the final stretch of the year as the depreciation pressures 
on the euro ceased. Even so, real Spanish goods and services exports continued to gain 
Both household expenditure 
and business investment were 
markedly dynamic, against a 
background of expanding 
government consumption and 
public investment…
… while the contribution of net 
external demand to output 
was negative, but with a fresh 
increase in the weight of 
Spanish exports on 
international markets 
1  These include most notably the reclassification within the general government sector of certain items of investment 
expenditure in prior years in public-private partnership projects (somewhat over €2 billion). Without excluding 
these temporary factors, general government investment in nominal terms grew by 21% in 2015.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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market share over the course of 2015. The increase in goods sales to developed countries 
and, in particular, to the euro area, outstripped the fall in those to emerging and developing 
countries, many of which directly felt the impact of the fall in commodities prices. The 
foregoing external factors, along with the economic recovery in the main countries 
providing tourists to Spain and the incidence of the geopolitical conflicts in certain North 
African and Middle Eastern destinations, contributed to the Spanish tourism sector having 
a very positive year. Specifically, the number of visitors and revenues (in nominal terms) 
showed year-on-year increases of 4.9% and 3.9%, respectively. 
Imports remained very buoyant, posting an increase of 7.5% following the 6.4% rise the 
previous year. The strength of private consumption and investment, and the resilience of 
exports, where some of the sectors with a high import content – such as automobiles – 
continue to grow significantly, boosted the increase in imports, despite the rise in prices of 
non-energy goods purchased abroad (see Box 2.2 in Chapter 2 of this Report).
Against this background, the Spanish economy’s lending capacity stood at 2.1% of GDP in 
2015 (0.5 pp of GDP up on the previous year). This is chiefly due to the increase in the current 
account surplus, associated with the reduction in the energy deficit, and in net investment 
income payments to the rest of the world. Specifically, last year there were savings of 
€11 billion in the energy bill and of €3.5 billion in net interest payments. The improvement in 
the terms of trade, owing to cheaper commodities prices, enabled the path of trade 
surpluses embarked upon in 2011 to be maintained, with the surplus standing at around 
2.5% of GDP. Adding to these temporary factors is the improvement in competitiveness, 
which is more structural in nature and which is analysed in detail in Chapter 2 of this Report. 
Household and corporate financing conditions continued to ease in 2015, benefiting from 
the monetary policy measures adopted by the ECB. There were thus across-the-board 
reductions in interest rates on new lending business in all segments, most acutely so in 
loans to small corporations, which translated into greater proximity to the costs of loans in 
other euro area countries. In annual average terms, the nominal cost of financing fell last 
year by between 60 and 110 bp, according to the segment. In real terms the decline was 
somewhat less (40-90 bp), as average long-term inflation expectations were somewhat 
lower in 2015 than a year earlier (see Chart 1.4). According to the Bank Lending Survey, 
throughout 2015 the spread applied to ordinary loans declined in all segments and lending 
standards were relaxed slightly in respect of loans to households, while they remained 
unchanged in loans to firms. The survey on SMEs’ access to credit reveals a substantial 
improvement in these companies’ perception of their access to financing. The demand of 
both households and firms for credit increased, boosted by the improvement in financing 
conditions and by the more favourable expectations of those demanding funds.  In the 
case of general government, the cost of financing fell slightly at the short and medium end 
of the yield curve, while at the long end, following the significant reduction in the two 
previous years, it oscillated around end-2014 levels. 
Both the recovery in gross financing flows and the reduction in payments associated with 
the repayment of debts incurred (the result of lower debt levels and of the decline in 
financing costs) have led to an increase in the volume of funds available for business and 
household expenditure (see panel 5 of Chart 1.4). Despite the increase in new lending, 
aggregate net financing flows remained negative, albeit for increasingly more moderate 
amounts. Specifically, the year-on-year rate of decline of household financing stood at 
2.3% in December 2015, 1.4 pp less than 12 months earlier, and in the case of corporations 
it stood at 0.9%, the fall lessening by 3.5 pp in relation to 2014. 
The growth of imports was 
very significant, driven by final 
demand
The nation’s lending capacity 
widened to 2.1% of GDP
Household and corporate 
financing conditions eased 
and credit market activity 
continued to pick up 
The fall in financial costs has 
boosted the funds available 
for expenditure, which has 
also been supported by the 
easing in the pace of decline 
of net financing flows 
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SOURCES: Datastream, Reuters, ECB and Banco de España.
a Defined as the aggregate weighted by GDP at current prices for the same year of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg. In 2015 and 2016, 
2014 GDP has been used. To aggregate the different categories by maturity within each country, the same weights (turnover) are used as in Spain, whereby the 
comparison is not affected by differences between these weights from one area to another.
b Real interest rates have been calculated by subtracting from nominal interest rates the inflation expectations at different horizons obtained from the inflation-linked 
swaps for Spain. For housing loans, the fifteen-year term has been used; for loans for consumption and other purposes, the five-year term; and for loans to 
non-financial corporations, the ten-year term.
c Estimate of interest payments plus principal repayments.
d Based on estimated changes in the housing stock, in the average surface area of such housing and in the price per square metre.
e Includes net financial wealth (financial assets - liabilities) and real estate wealth.
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Over the year as a whole, employment continued to grow sharply, at a year-on-year rate of 
3%; however, at end-2015 only around 30% of the jobs lost from 2008 to early 2014 had 
been recovered. In terms of the sectors of activity, the increase in employment was across 
the board, albeit somewhat sharper in industry and in construction. By type of contract, 
the rise in employment was centred on temporary employees (see panel 4 of Chart 1.6), 
while by working day the increase in those working full-time exceeded the figures observed 
for those employed part-time. 
In 2015 as a whole, the declines observed in previous years in the labour force eased to 
-0.1%. The reduction in the final stretch of the year was basically due to the decline in the 
participation rate, especially among youths returning to training more intensely. This 
reduction in the labour force, along with the buoyancy of employment, translated into a 
reduction of almost 680,000 in numbers unemployed compared with the previous year. The 
unemployment rate fell 2.3 pp in 2015 as a whole to 22.1%, standing in 2016 Q1 at 21%, 
almost 3 pp down on the figure observed in the same period a year earlier (see Chart 1.5). 
Unit labour costs held on the moderating path of recent years, although their pace of 
decline eased. Compensation per employee in the market economy stabilised in 2015, 
posting a marginal increase of 0.1%, following the 0.6% decline in 2014. Wage rises 
agreed under collective bargaining moved on a moderately rising trend in the final stretch 
of the year, tending to converge towards the upper limit of 1% envisaged in the 
recommendation included in the Agreement for Employment and Collective Bargaining 
entered into by the social agents in mid-2015. As has habitually been the case in previous 
recovery phases, the dynamism of apparent labour productivity eased, growing by 0.3% 
in the market economy (0.9% in 2014). 
CPI-based inflation posted a negative change in 2015, falling off by 0.5%, against 0.2% the 
previous year. As in 2014, the declining year-on-year profile of the CPI during the year was 
strongly influenced by the effect of oil prices, the decline in which quickened as from August. 
The non-energy CPI and the CPI excluding energy and unprocessed food prices held on a 
slowly and gradually accelerating path, whereby both indices showed year-on-year rates in 
December of 0.9% and 1.1%, respectively (see Chart 1.2). These increases are in line with 
Employment grew forcefully 
and across the board in terms 
of sectors of activity, albeit 
more sharply so in the case of 
temporary contracts 
The pace of decline in the 
unemployment rate 
increased…
… against a background of 
wage moderation 
Inflation moved on a declining 
trajectory from August, while 
the non-energy components 
held on a gradually 
accelerating course 
throughout the year 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE, European Commission and Banco de España.
a Data in annual frequency and in index numbers.
b Quarterly-frequency gross data of harmonised labour force surveys.
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the strength of domestic demand and the gradual reduction in the economy’s cyclical 
slack, which made for a less marked adjustment in labour costs and more moderate 
growth than in previous years in the gross surplus. 
Following the double-dip recession that ended in mid-2013, the Spanish economy has 
seen a cyclical recovery phase take root that is significantly sharper, on average, than 
that of its European partners. However, the current expansion can hardly continue to be 
underpinned to the same extent as it was in the past by the aforementioned expansionary 
factors. Specifically, in the absence of further shocks, it is to be expected that the 
impact on growth rates of the more temporary factors such as those observed since 
mid-2014 and discussed in the previous section will begin to diminish.2 Thus, growth in 
the Spanish economy will foreseeably hold at more moderate levels than those recorded 
last year, as is indeed reflected in the latest macroeconomic projections published by 
the Banco de España, according to which GDP is expected to grow at a rate of 2.7% in 
2016 and 2.3% in 2017. 
On the international front, various factors – such as the slowdown (or recession in the odd 
case) in some of the main emerging economies, geopolitical conflicts in certain areas, the 
sluggishness of world trade, the supply glut in the oil market and the low profitability of 
banks –  shape a complex setting for the global economy. At the domestic level, the need 
to resume and see through fiscal consolidation, which is essential for retaining confidence 
in the Spanish economy, will entail short-term costs but will give rise to benefits in the 
medium term. The uncertainty linked to the domestic political setting increases, in turn, the 
doubts over the future course of economic policies and the implementation of the reforms 
needed to bring to fruition the challenges outstanding for the Spanish economy and to 
improve its future growth prospects. 
Compared with other euro area economies, the economic crisis impacted Spain with 
greater intensity (see Chart 1.5) and, despite the headway being made in the current 
recovery phase in absorbing the main imbalances, the persistence of some of them reveals 
factors of vulnerability and poses deep-seated challenges in respect of economic policies. 
Highlighted below are the adjustments outstanding as regards the labour market, fiscal 
consolidation, private debt, financial dependence on the external sector and productivity. 
Finally, some challenges outstanding in the construction of the EMU are briefly set out. 
 
Despite its recent favourable course, the Spanish labour market faces the challenge of 
reducing high unemployment, so as to prevent a considerable portion of such unemployment 
becoming structural, and to promote a more dynamic productivity performance (see Box 
1.2). The unemployment rate dipped in early 2016 to 21%, almost 6 pp below its 2013 peak, 
but still far above the level observed in other European countries. Furthermore, this reduction 
has not passed through with sufficient intensity to the groups that have been unemployed 
for longest. Indeed, the percentage of long-term unemployment (those in this position for 
more than one year) still stood at 57.7% in early 2016. The persistence of such a high 
unemployment rate is one of the main factors that explains the increase in income inequality 
in Spain. The countercyclical behaviour of the commonest measures of inequality in Spain, 
2.4  TOWARDS A NEW PHASE 
OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
The diminished contribution of 
some of the temporary factors 
that have recently boosted 
activity suggests more 
moderate economic growth in 
the short and medium term...
…and the risks to growth have 
increased as a result of the 
uncertainty about the global 
economy, the need to resume 
a path of fiscal consolidation 
and doubts over domestic 
economic policies …
3  The challenges 
outstanding for the 
Spanish economy and 
the role of economic 
policies
Restoring macrofinancial 
equilibria and raising 
productivity are vital for further 
progress in the recovery of 
activity and employment levels 
3.1  REDUCING 
UNEMPLOYMENT
The persistence of high rates 
of joblessness increases the 
likelihood of unemployment 
becoming structural 
2  See the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” in the March 2016 edition of the Banco de España Economic 
Bulletin.
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which tend to show an increase in inequality in periods of recession, is closely related to the 
dynamics of job creation and destruction flows, which is highly asymmetrical across 
different jobs, depending on the level of skills required and the associated type of 
employment contract.3
The successive labour reforms approved in recent years added substantial changes to the 
institutional design of this market. The analyses available about their effects reveal that 
these reforms, especially that in 2012, have provided for wage moderation by promoting a 
greater adjustment of working conditions to an environment characterised by sluggish 
demand and high unemployment.4 And this has proven crucial for restoring the 
competitiveness of the Spanish economy and of employment (see Chapter 2 of this Report 
for a more detailed analysis). 
In 2015 the pattern of wage containment was maintained; however, in a negative inflation 
environment, real wages increased by 0.5% in the private sector, set against the declines 
recorded in previous years (see panel 2 of Chart 1.6). A portion of this increase in real wage 
income was as a result of the recent decline in oil prices, via their negative impact on 
consumer prices. In this respect, in a low inflation setting across the entire euro area and 
given the modest growth in productivity, as is projected for the Spanish economy in the 
coming quarters, excess downward rigidity in nominal wages might hamper the 
entrenchment of the gains in competitiveness obtained in recent years (see panel 1 of 
Chart 1.6).
The firming of a path of balanced growth also involves the reallocation of employment 
across firms and sectors of activity, requiring adjustments in relative prices and costs, 
in such a way that wages are linked to the specific conditions prevailing in the various 
sectors and firms. While the relationship between wage settlements and the cyclical 
position of the various productive sectors has become closer in recent years, it remains 
limited.5
Behind this phenomenon lies a collective bargaining structure characterised by the 
prevalence of sectoral agreements, with scant influence of firm-level agreements, which 
currently affect only 6% of workers. Disaggregated information on collective bargaining 
agreements highlights a limited dispersion across firms of the wage increases agreed in 
the past two years (see panel 3 of Chart 1.6). This may reduce the incentives for the 
efficient reallocation of resources across activities. Further, sectoral agreements pose 
obstacles to the entry of new firms, which have to match, from the outset, the working 
conditions agreed in sectoral, regional and national agreements. 
The dynamism of employment in 2015 was concentrated in temporary hires, which rose by 
8.3%, against 1.9% for permanent employees. That raised the ratio of temporary to total 
workers to 25.7% at the end of the year, almost 4 pp up on the level in early 2013, when 
this rate was at its cyclical low (see panel 4 of Chart 1.6). A disaggregated analysis at the 
The new regulatory framework 
of the labour market provides 
for a better adjustment of 
wages to the macroeconomic 
situation and to the conditions 
prevailing in firms, which has 
boosted growth in 
employment 
In a very low or even negative 
inflation environment, wage 
flexibility is essential for 
sustaining the current path of 
employment creation 
There is still scant linkage of 
wages to firms’ specific 
conditions...
... in a setting in which the 
weight of firm-level collective 
bargaining is still very low 
Employment growth continues 
to be concentrated in 
temporary hires, an aspect 
which the successive labour 
reforms have not corrected… 
3  See Bonhomme, S., and L. Hospido (2012), “The Cycle of Earnings Inequality: Evidence from Spanish Social 
Security Data”, Working Paper 1225, Banco de España,
4  See, Izquierdo, M., A. Lacuesta and S. Puente (2013), “The 2012 labour reform: an initial analysis of some of its 
effects on the labour market”, Economic Bulletin, Banco de España, September; Izquierdo.M and J.F.Jimeno 
(2015), “Employment, wage and price reactions to the crisis in Spain: firm-level evidence from the WDN survey”, 
Occasional Paper 1503, Banco de España.
5  See Font, P., M. Izquierdo and S. Puente (2015), “Real wage responsiveness to unemployment in Spain: 
Asymmetries along the business cycle”, IZA Journal of European Labor Studies.
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sectoral level, in which the change in the temporary employment ratio is related to 
employment growth, would suggest that this recent increase in temporary hires matches 
— on historical patterns — the behaviour expected in an expansionary period, without 
there being any discernible recent change that may be attributed to the various legal 
amendments made in recent years. 
The recent increase in temporary hires is linked to the rise observed in unemployment 
outflows towards temporary employment, in a setting in which the flows towards permanent 
employment have risen slightly. And no significant increase been seen in conversions of 
temporary contracts into permanent ones, the latter having moved on a clearly declining 
course since the start of the crisis and, in the more recent period, held at low levels. 
Nonetheless, a better performance has been seen in permanent employment destruction 
flows, which eased in 2015 to levels similar to those observed pre-crisis. Conversely, 
temporary employment destruction remains at high levels. 
… while the pace of 
permanent job destruction has 
been checked 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social.
a QNA nominal compensation per employee deflated by the CPI or the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy. Rates are calculated on seasonally adjusted 
series.
b 2016, with information to March.
c Temporary employees as a proportion of total employees, calculated with Q2 data for each year.
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Reducing unemployment will require additional measures which, firstly, should enable 
firms to opt for aligning working conditions to their specific situation and to reinforce firms’ 
internal flexibility, in line with the labour market institutions existing in other European 
countries. Furthermore, the attractiveness of permanent hiring should be increased, 
preventing an excessive protection of this type of employment from ultimately acting as a 
deterrent to the creation of stable jobs. Finally, active policies should contribute to 
enhancing the employability of those workers who have been unemployed for a lengthy 
period and who have lower skills than those required by firms. Here, it is vital to improve 
the link between active and passive policies, to modernise the public employment services 
and to increase the resources available per person in active policies for the unemployed. 
In particular, it would be desirable to re-launch vocational training activities which, in 
comparison with other European countries, are relatively scant in Spain, as opposed to the 
high weight of hiring incentives, whose effectiveness is usually limited.6 In addition, a 
rigorous assessment should be made of the different measures that may help steer 
resources towards the most effective policies. 
According to the latest Excessive Deficit Protocol (EDP) notification, the Spanish general 
government sector posted a deficit of 5.1% of GDP, against 5.9% the previous year. This 
reduction was due exclusively to the cyclical improvement in the economy, whereas the 
structural primary budget deficit, which measures the fiscal policy stance, increased by 
1 pp of GDP, and the total structural deficit was close to 3% of GDP, according to the 
European Commission’s latest estimates. The year 2015 thus saw an interruption in the 
contractionary budgetary policy stance observed from 2010 to 2014, when the structural 
deficit improved by 5.2 pp of GDP (see panel 1 of Chart 1.7). The strong rate of increase in 
output along with a highly favourable deficit-debt adjustment7 enabled the still-high budget 
deficit to be offset, thereby placing the public debt/GDP ratio at 99.2% (99.3% in 2014) 
(see panel 2 of Chart 1.7). 
These developments entailed significant non-fulfilment in 2015, of close to 1 pp of GDP, of 
the budget deficit target of 4.2% set by the European authorities under the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure of the Stability and Growth Pact. By sub-sector (see panel 4 of Chart 
1.7), the slippage was due to bigger deficits relative to the targets for the regional 
governments (1 pp) and the Social Security system (0.7 pp), which were partly offset by a 
better-than-expected outturn for central government (0.2 pp) and local governments 
(0.4 pp). The failure of the regional governments to meet targets was across the board, 
since only three of them fulfilled the objectives set. In terms of components (see panel 3 of 
Chart 1.7), comparison between the 2015 data and the estimates provided in the general 
government budgetary plan sent by the Government to the EC in September 2015 shows 
that the deviation of the deficit was due essentially to higher-than-forecast (by 1.4 pp of 
GDP) growth in public spending. 
Further measures are therefore 
needed to quicken the decline 
in unemployment and reduce 
the weight of temporary 
employment 
3.2  FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 
In the fiscal policy arena, there 
was a deterioration in the 
structural budget deficit in 
2015… 
…which prompted significant 
slippage by the budget deficit 
from the target set by the 
European authorities 
6  See Arranz, J.M., C. García Serrano and V. Herranz (2013), “Active labour market policies in Spain: A 
macroeconomic evaluation”, International Labour Review.
7  The deficit-debt adjustment allows general government deficit data to be reconciled with those relating to 
changes in the debt ratio. Specifically reflected in this adjustment are, along with the operations that do not 
affect the deficit but do bear on government debt, the need to finance the net acquisition of financial assets. 
In 2015 there were net sales of financial assets totalling €16.5 billion, providing for a reduction of 1.5 pp of 
GDP in the debt ratio. Specifically, there were repayments relating to the loans granted in previous years 
through the European Financial Stability Fund, and to the Electricity Deficit Amortisation Fund and the Fund 
for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector. Moreover, some financial assets were disposed of, 
including most notably the partial privatisation of AENA. For further details see M. Delgado, B. García, L. 
Gordo and RF. Martí (2016), “La evolución de la deuda pública en España en 2015”, Boletín Económico, May, 
Banco de España.
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The challenges the current fiscal imbalance poses for the economy as a whole, even under 
the prospect of its gradual reduction, should not be minimised.8High volumes of deficits and 
public debt sustained over prolonged periods are usually associated with higher interest rates 
and, therefore, with lower rates of private investment and growth in the medium term. In 
particular, the sustainability of a high level of public debt normally requires the recurrent 
running of significant primary budget surpluses; that may adversely affect the economy’s 
potential growth if, for example, fiscal policy should entail tax levels unfavourable to growth 
or lower levels of productive spending. Moreover, high deficit and public debt levels restrict 
the room for manoeuvre available to fiscal policy to play a countercyclical role, a lever which 
is particularly valuable within a monetary union. Also, the need to resort repeatedly to the 
financial markets to roll over a high volume of debt and the current deficit raises the vulnerability 
of the economy to potential adverse reactions in investor sentiment, as has been evidenced 
in the successive episodes of tightening experienced by several European sovereign debt 
markets since 2010. 
Correcting the fiscal 
imbalance is a priority …
8  See Box 4.2 of the Banco de España 2013 Annual Report.
SOURCES: AMECO and Banco de España.
a Actual balance, cyclically adjusted and net of temporary measures.
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The scale of the adjustments needed to restore health to public finances remains significant.9 
That highlights the need to define a medium-term consolidation path detailing the measures 
to ensure the fulfilment of the fiscal targets covering each and every one of the different tiers 
of government (central government, Social Security system, regional government and local 
government), and that is anchored in a prudent forecast of macroeconomic developments 
and of public revenue. In this respect, the European Commission issued a recommendation 
on 18 May calling for a structural improvement in the Spanish overall general government 
balance of 0.25% and 0.5% in 2016 and 2017, respectively, which, according to the EC, 
would make for deficits of 3.7% and 2.5% of GDP in those years. Accordingly, Spain’s exit 
from an excessive deficit position would be put back by one year to 2017.
In parallel, the use of all the preventive and coercive mechanisms of the Budgetary Stability 
Law across the general government sector as a whole must be ensured.10 Further, in a 
setting in which central government mechanisms to support regional government liquidity 
have become widespread, it is vital that the explicit elements of conditionality be strictly 
applied to the budgetary actions of the tiers of government concerned.11
In a scenario in which the budgetary consolidation process is prolonged, the composition of 
the adjustment takes on particular importance, paving the way for public finances to make a 
greater contribution to the economy’s potential growth. In this respect, progress must 
continue to be made in the rationalisation and efficiency of public spending, considering a 
review of the basket of taxes that will allow the revenue needed to finance the desired level of 
public spending to be obtained in a stable fashion (see panel 3 of Chart 1.7). Experts’ and 
international agencies’ proposals suggest there is scope for considering a change in the tax 
mix, according greater weight to indirect taxation, and a further rationalisation of the wide 
range of deductions, credits and rebates that erode tax-raising capacity.
From a medium and long-term perspective, it will be a priority to address the challenges 
arising from the impact of population ageing on public finances and, in particular, on the 
pension system. The reforms introduced in recent years are along these lines, including as 
they do a progressive raising of the retirement age, the definition of a sustainability factor, 
which links the initial pension to future developments in life expectancy, and a new pension 
indexation mechanism, making pensions conditional upon the financial equilibrium of the 
system.12 These reforms have substantially shored up the system’s sustainability, although 
tailoring arrangements to the needs of a progressively older population poses notable 
challenges. Specifically, in the absence of further modifications to the system’s revenue, 
the adjustment mechanism operates chiefly through the average pension13 which, given 
significant growth in the dependency ratio, raises the need to analyse the potential 
incorporation of other sources of financing into the system, to define the concepts that are 
financed through the system and, where appropriate, to develop the insurance and saving 
... that requires the definition 
of a detailed medium-term 
consolidation programme and 
the strict application of the 
preventive and coercive 
mechanisms of the Budgetary 
Stability Law 
Fiscal consolidation should be 
accompanied by a design of 
the main budgetary elements 
that is more conducive to 
activity and employment …
… and by a strategy with 
which to tackle the challenges 
posed by population ageing 
for public finances 
   9  An approximate idea can be had of the challenges outstanding using a simple accounting simulation exercise 
based on the general government budget constraint. If it is assumed that the general government primary 
balance will, from 2016, every year, stand at 2% of GDP (as opposed to the primary deficit of 2% observed in 
2015) and nominal GDP growth will be 3.5%, the public debt/GDP ratio would not fall below 30% before 2030.
10  See P. Hernández de Cos and J. Pérez (2013), “The new budgetary stability law”, Boletín Económico, April, 
Banco de España.
11  See Delgado, M., C. González and J.J. Pérez (2016), “Regional government access to market funding: 
international experience and recent developments”, Economic Bulletin, February, Banco de España.
12  See Ramos, R. (2014), “The new revaluation and sustainability factor of the Spanish pension system”, Economic 
Bulletin, July, Banco de España.
13  Sánchez, A.R. (2014), “The automatic adjustment of pension expenditures in Spain: an evaluation of the 2013 
pension reform”, Working Paper 1420, Banco de España.
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mechanisms — such as those set in place in other countries — that will help complement 
unfunded public pensions in the future. The new system may also increase uncertainty 
over the future level of pensions, whereby its implementation should be as transparent as 
possible, in accordance with the mechanisms envisaged by the Law, so as to provide 
citizens with the necessary information about their future pension and to enable individuals 
to take optimal saving decisions for retirement during their working life. 
Spanish household and corporate debt ratios continued to decline in 2015, falling to 69% 
and 88% of GDP, respectively (see panels 1 and 2 of Chart 1.8). As a result, the cumulative 
declines in these ratios from their mid-2010 peak were 17 pp and 32 pp, respectively. Also, 
the gap between debt levels in Spain and in the euro area has narrowed to 8 pp and 7 pp, 
respectively, suggesting that private-sector deleveraging is at an advanced phase. This 
process is, moreover, progressively becoming less costly, as it is underpinned to a lesser 
extent than in the past on negative net financing flows and more on increases in income.
3.3  PRIVATE-SECTOR 
DELEVERAGING 
The reduction in the debt ratio 
of households and firms 
continued in 2015, 
underpinned to a greater 
extent by higher income …
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The calculations have been made using cross-matched information from the CCR (Central Credit Register) and the CBSO (Central Balance Sheet Data Office). Total 
factor productivity measures the relationship between the use of productive factors and the amount of output obtained, and approximates the level of efficiency of 
the firm. It is obtained drawing on regressions made at the sectoral level of the logarithm of real gross value added over the logarithms of total capital, inputs and 
employment (time fixed effects are also included). An approximation is thus attained of the weights of capital and employment in the production function, providing 
for calculation of total factor productivity at the level of the firm. The chart plots median productivity, calculated as the weighted average of the sectoral medians, 
where weights are assigned on the basis of the sectoral gross value added of each sector of activity. The resulting figure is normalised taking as a reference the 
2008 value of the median productivity of firms whose credit is declining.
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In 2015 there was an increase in new financing flows to households and non-financial 
corporations which, along with the reduction in the interest burden, proved conducive to 
buoyant expenditure. The Banco de España Central Credit Register (CCR) reveals that 
the proportion of firms not subject to deleveraging processes increased in 2015 for the 
third year running, to stand at close to 43%, almost 9 pp up on the 2012 figure. The net 
flow of financing channelled by these companies increased by almost 1 pp relative to 
GDP (see panel 3 of Chart 1.8). Likewise, in the case of households, there was a rise in 
the proportion of individuals whose debts held steady or increased, and in the net flow of 
financing raised by them. 
The slowdown in the pace of the contraction in bank lending to firms (by 5.2 pp to 1.6%) 
has been extensive to all sectors of activity, although the decline continued to be sharper 
in sectors linked to the real estate market. In the industrial sector, the outstanding balance 
of loans fell by 1.6%, while in construction and real estate services, the declines continued 
to be notable (11.8% and 10.4%, respectively), albeit lower than those in 2014. There were 
also signs suggesting that credit flows tend to be routed increasingly towards more 
productive firms with a sounder financial position (see panel 4 of Chart 1.8). 
In the case of credit institutions, the improvement in their financial position has also 
contributed to the pick-up in the flow of financing to households and non-financial 
corporations. Deposit institutions thus continued to shore up their solvency in 2015, 
whereby their CET1 (highest quality capital) ratio rose to 12.7% (14.5% in terms of the total 
ratio), after increasing notably during the year, standing clearly above the required 
regulatory minimum levels. In a setting of abundant liquidity, prompted by the Eurosystem’s 
various expansionary measures, these institutions continued to finance themselves 
comfortably. 
That said, pressures on the profit and loss account were reflected in a 12.8% decline in 
consolidated profit attributable to the group, meaning that the return on equity (ROE) fell 
(from 6.9% to 5.6%, also owing partly to the increase in own funds), following the same 
trend as in the rest of the euro area. There are several factors exerting downward pressure 
on banks’ profitability, especially in business in Spain. Firstly, low interest rates are 
constraining net interest income. Secondly, compounding this situation is the fact that the 
outstanding balance of credit continues to decline, albeit at increasingly lower rates. 
Finally, non-performing loans and foreclosures, which do not generate interest, make up a 
significant but declining part of bank balance sheets.14
The economic recovery, which has been accompanied by growth in income and a reduction 
in unemployment, along with the decline in interest rates, has had a favourable effect on 
the financial position of indebted households and firms. The effect has been comparatively 
more marked in those segments subject to a greater degree of financial pressure. The 
reduction in these agents’ debt has benefited from the use of refinancing and, where 
appropriate, restructuring agreements, to which the improvements made to the successive 
regulatory changes in bankruptcy law have contributed (see Box 4.3 of this Report). Even 
so, the proportion of agents subject to high financial pressure still stands above pre-crisis 
levels, signifying a factor of vulnerability for the economy as a whole. 
… which proved compatible 
with a pick-up in the flow of 
new financing operations 
The decline in the aggregate 
outstanding balance of lending 
to corporations has been 
accompanied by significant 
inter-sectoral and intra-
sectoral shifts
Credit institutions’ improved 
solvency and liquidity have 
also contributed to the pick-
up in financing to households 
and firms…
… although Spanish credit 
institutions show low 
profitability 
There is still a portion of 
agents in a vulnerable financial 
position 
14  In particular, last year, non-performing loans in Spain fell across the board at a greater pace than the previous 
year, whereby the ratio of these assets to resident private-sector credit declined to 10.1%, at the close of the 
year, compared with the high of 13.6% two years earlier.
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Progress in the external balance continued in 2015, both in terms of the nation’s overall 
lending capacity and, to a lesser extent, of the international investment position. In the first 
instance, the balance has improved by around 11 pp of GDP since 2007, essentially as a 
result of the fall in investment – residential investment in particular – during the most acute 
phases of the crisis, although in the most recent period a pick-up in national saving has 
been observed (see Chart 1.9). 
 
The recent attainment of external lending capacity has a structural component that is 
reflected in the improvement in the cyclically adjusted balance of goods and services trade 
(see Chart 1.9). As analysed in detail in Chapter 2, this improvement in the structural 
component is related to the adjustment of labour costs and the easing in financial costs. 
In particular, the competitive adjustment made by the Spanish economy over these years 
has been conducive to an increase in firms’ propensity to sell their products abroad and to 
their subsequent capacity to entrench.
Despite the reduction in private debt, Spain still has very high external debt, which is a 
significant factor of vulnerability when set against potentially adverse developments on 
international markets. Thus, at end-2015 the net  international investment position (net 
IIP) stood at 90.5% of GDP, a very high figure when compared with other euro area 
countries and with other advanced economies, but one which entrenches the declining 
trend initiated the previous year. That said, the improvements in lending capacity have 
not been reflected in a reduction on the same scale in the external debit balance. That 
is due to the negative contribution of valuation effects and other adjustments, which 
showed the increase in the price of external liabilities derived from international 
investors’ greater confidence in the Spanish economy’s assets. There have also been 
changes in the composition of external liabilities, in terms of their callability (a shift 
towards a lesser weight of debt securities), the issuing institutional sector (greater 
3.4  REDUCING THE NET 
DEBTOR POSITION VIS-À-
VIS THE REST OF THE 
WORLD
The recent recovery in national 
saving is allowing investment 
to be financed and recurrent 
external surpluses to be 
obtained 
Since the start of the crisis 
there has been a structural 
improvement in the trade 
balance of goods and 
services…
... but the net debtor position 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, 
though it has begun to 
decline, is holding at very high 
levels and its correction will 
require further gains in 
competitiveness 
SOURCES: Banco de España, INE and IMF.
a Investment depicted with sign changed.
b Trade balance had both the Spanish economy and its main trading partners grown at a similar rate to the potential GDP rate.
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proportion of securities issued by the public sector) and the maturity of the assets 
(longer average maturity), which, overall, may contribute to mitigating some of the risks 
posed by such a high volume of external liabilities (see Chart 1.10). All told, gross 
external debt, which encompasses callable liabilities, remains at a very high level 
(167.9% of GDP at end-2015). Accordingly, the correction of high external debt will 
require running current account surpluses sustainedly over a prolonged period, in which 
connection it will be vital to build on and entrench the gains in competitiveness attained 
in recent years.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Gross external debt is the amount pending repayment at a given time of real and non-contingent current liabilities assumed by an economy’s residents vis-àvis 
non-residents, with the commitment to make in the future payments of principal, interest or both. It therefore includes: debt securities, special drawing rights 
assigned, and deposits, loans, trade credit and other liabilities.
b Valuation effects are gains/losses relating to the exchange rate and/or financial instrument prices, while other adjustments are other changes in volume, including 
most notably write-offs owing to recognition of the impossibility of recovering funds, assets and/or liabilities reclassification, and changes in residence of holders 
or issuers of financial assets and liabilities.
c Non-callable liabilities include equity capital, financial derivatives and reserves. Callable liabilities coincide with gross external debt.
d The transactions in question are financial transactions between residents and non-residents..
e GG - general government; OMFI - Other Monetary Financial Institutions; ORS - Other Resident Sectors, which include non-monetary financial institutions, 
non-financial corporations, and households and non-profit institutions serving households.
f S-T and L-T refer to the classification of the term of issue depending on whether the maturity is short-term or long-term, respectively.
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The available estimates of growth in the Spanish economy’s potential output show a 
reduction from approximately 3% in the 2001-2007 period to around 0.6% on average 
from 2008 to 2014.15 In the previous upturn, the increase in potential growth was based 
on the accumulation of productive factors, with a slightly negative contribution of total 
factor productivity (TFP) (see Table 1.2). There was a turnaround in this pattern with the 
onset of the crisis, giving rise to a lesser contribution of capital and a negative 
contribution of employment derived from the population decline – caused by net 
emigrant outflows during this period and progressive population ageing – and from the 
increase in structural unemployment. Conversely, the contribution of TFP turned round 
to become slightly positive. 
For illustrative purposes, aggregate productivity growth can be broken down, first, into the 
contribution stemming from firms’ average productivity, which is influenced by intrinsic 
improvements in worker and entrepreneurial skills, business organisation and technology; 
and further, into the contribution derived from the reallocation of resources across firms 
with different levels of productivity.16 In Spain’s case, this second factor has proven to be 
the most significant in explaining both the low growth of TFP in the previous upturn and 
the recovery observed in the recent period (see Table 1.2). This improvement would appear 
to be related above all to the destruction of the least efficient firms during the recession 
and the gain in market share of those that are most productive within each sector, whereas 
sectoral reallocation would be playing a limited role.  
3.5  IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY 
Potential growth fell 
significantly during the crisis, 
as a result of the lesser 
contribution of the productive 
factors…
…although there was a slight 
pick-up in TFP, based above 
all on a better reallocation of 
resources across firms…
15  See Moral, E. and P. Cuadrado (2016), “Potential growth of the Spanish economy”, Occasional Paper 1603, 
Banco de España.
16  That is to say, this channel explains an increase in TFP derived from a reallocation of resources that raises the 
weight of firms or sectors that show higher relative levels of productivity.
SOURCES: Central de Balances del Banco de España and P. Cuadrado and E. Moral-Benito (2016), Potential growth of the Spanish economy, Occasional 
Papers 1603.
a The figures show the average growth for the period.
b Aggregate productivity can be expressed as the weighted average of each company’s (or each sector’s) productivity, with weightings given by the weight of each 
company (or each sector) in economic activity. On the basis of this weighted average, productivity growth can be broken down into a term that shows the sum of 
the growth in productivity of each company weighted by the weight of each company in economic activity (intra-company term), and into another term that refers 
to the sum of the changes in the weights of each company weighted by their productivity levels (inter-company term). That is to say, the intra-company (or 
intra-sector) term quantifies the contribution of companies’ (or sectors’) productivity growth to aggregate productivity growth; the inter-company (or inter-sector) term 
shows the contribution of the reallocation of resources across companies (or sectors) given their initial productivity. For further details see L. Foster, J. Haltiwanger 
and C. Krizan (2006), “Market selection, reallocation, and restructuring in the US retail trade sector in the 1990s”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88 (4), 
pp. 748-758. In the 1995-2007 period, the percentages total -100% because productivity growth was negative.
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In any event, TFP in the Spanish economy is still holding at significantly lower growth 
rates than those of the other developed countries, such as the United States or Germany 
(see Chart 1.11). Higher productivity is crucial for attaining higher potential output growth 
rates in the medium term, given the adverse effect of the progressive ageing of the 
population on such growth. This should be a primary goal of the reforms to product and 
labour markets (see Box 1.3).
Converging on the productivity levels of those developed economies showing a better 
performance in this area therefore requires promoting an increase in firms’ average 
productivity, which firstly calls for better regulation of certain sectors whose functioning is 
essential for business activity (see Chapter 4 of this Report). In this respect, some reforms 
have been approved in recent years but others are still pending. Hence, in the case of the 
electricity industry, measures have been adopted to contain the tariff deficit and a new 
interconnection with France has been opened, although the electricity price ultimately paid 
by firms and consumers continues to be high relative to other developed economies. The 
indicators available show greater regulatory constraints on other significant factors of 
production, such as transport and professional services.17 These sectors also tend to 
evidence higher mark-ups in Spain than in other developed countries, and such mark-ups 
are expected to have increased over the course of the crisis.18
Infrastructure endowment and human and technological capital are also fundamental 
conditioning factors of business productivity. In the first instance, during the upturn 
prior to the crisis, Spain’s volume of per capita public capital matched that of the euro 
area when in 1995 it was 15% below it. However, public investment has been one of 
the public spending items most affected by the ongoing reduction of the budget deficit. 
The need to continue pursuing fiscal consolidation will require a strict economic 
assessment of the different projects so that those with the greatest value-added may 
be selected. 
Improving potential growth in 
the economy in the medium 
term will hinge crucially on 
successfully achieving greater 
dynamism in productivity… 
… suggesting the need for 
reforms generating greater 
efficiency in certain sectors
In this setting, it will be 
necessary to ensure the 
rigorous selection of 
infrastructure projects…
17  See Mora-Sanguinetti, J.S. and M. Martínez (2014), “La regulación en el mercado de productos en España 
según los indicadores de la OCDE”, Boletín Económico, diciembre, Banco de España.
18  See Amador, Di Comite, Fuss, Hagemejer, Montero and Soares (2015), “Price-cost margin dynamics and heterogeneity: 
Evidence from European firm-level data”, forthcoming ECB Working Paper; and Soares (2016), “Price-cost margin and 
bargaining power: A cross-country analysis using firm-level data”, forthcoming ECB Working Paper.
SOURCES: European Commission, Competitiveness Research Network of the ECB and Banco de España.
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In the case of human capital, there has been a most significant improvement in recent 
decades, although room remains for convergence in terms of the labour force’s 
educational attainment in comparison with that of other European countries. In particular, 
the Spanish education system is notable for its high early school leaver rate, the under-
use of vocational training arrangements and a low level of quality.19 The economic 
crisis has, moreover, led to a concentration of job destruction among the least skilled 
and, in this way, it has substantially raised the degree of educational mismatch between 
labour supply and demand, which might hamper the employability of the least skilled 
(see Box 1.2). 
As regards technological capital, Spain is again characterised by lower levels than other 
developed countries. Specifically, the stock of technological capital as a percentage of 
GDP stood at 36% below the euro area average in 2013 (see Chapter 4 of this Report). 
This situation would affect both the public sector and, above all, the private sector, and 
would concern aspects such as workers’ relative training, the excessive weight of small 
firms, which usually have a lesser propensity to innovate, and the limited development of 
alternative financial channels, such as venture capital, which is widely used in other 
countries by technology-based start-ups. Spanish firms also have a limited technological 
absorption capacity, while the public research system is characterised by fragmentation 
and a lack of connectedness to the business system. 
The quality of the institutional framework has also been shown to be significant for 
explaining cross-country productivity differences.20 In this respect, the indicators 
proxying the legal and administrative framework in which the public and private sectors 
interact show that Spain has considerable room for improvement in this area.21 According 
to various statistical information sources, the efficiency indices for the Spanish legal 
system are below those of other comparable countries, while our litigation rate is 
higher22, highlighting the need to identify the factors that lie behind these developments 
and to redress them. 
It is also essential to build on the recent improvement observed in the allocation of 
resources across firms. In this connection, access by productive firms to financing for their 
investment projects should be ensured, while those aspects of the regulations that hamper 
the growth of the most efficient firms should be revised. In recent years there has been 
some progress here with the approval and implementation of the Law on the Guaranteeing 
of Market Unity, the Law on the Common Administrative Procedure and the added flexibility 
… to promote the 
accumulation of human 
capital,…
… technological capital…
... improved institutional 
quality...
… and to revise the 
regulations that hamper 
business start-ups and growth 
19  For instance, the OECD’s PIAAC (2013) results (http://www.mecd.gob.es/inee/Ultimos_informes/PIAAC.html) 
highlight the Spanish population’s poor maths skills, which range across the board among individuals with 
different levels of educational attainment, including higher education. 
20  See, for example, R.E. Hall and C.I. Jones (1999), “Why do some countries produce so much more output per 
worker than others?”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, pp. 83-116, and E. Helpman (Ed.) (2008), 
Institutions and economic performance, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. For the Spanish 
case, M. García-Santana, F. Moral-Benito, J. Pijoan-Mas and R. Ramos (2016), “Growing like Spain: 1995-2007”, 
Banco de España Working Paper 1609, find that the deterioration in resource allocation in Spain observed from 
1995 to 2007 was more severe in sectors where the incidence of government regulations is greater. 
21  For example, the indicator of the quality of public institutions constructed by the World Economic Forum as part 
of its “Global competitiveness report 2015-2016” ranks Spain 20th out of 28 European Union countries. This 
indicator is partly based on a questionnaire to firms and includes information on ownership rights and their 
protection, ethical and corruption-related issues, judicial independence, public sector efficiency or security, 
among other aspects. (For more detailed information see http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-
report-2015-2016//). Similar results for Spain are obtained from the World Bank’s “The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators” (see htpp://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home).
22  See Mora-Sanguinetti, J.S. (2016), “Evidencia reciente sobre los efectos económicos del funcionamiento de la 
justicia en España”, Boletín Económico del Banco de España, January.
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to insolvency proceedings.23 However, as may be inferred from the regional business 
climate indicators, Spain continues to face greater difficulties than its peers regarding 
business start-ups. Further, a wide range of regulations remain in place that distort 
company growth and which, therefore, directly influence the reallocation of resources 
across firms and sectors (see Chapter 4 of this Report). 
Beyond its domestic conditioning factors, the Spanish economy depends crucially on 
international developments, in particular those relating to the euro area. In this respect, the 
euro area faces a complex scenario, characterised by an outlook of moderate growth and 
low inflation and by still-high unemployment and debt levels in certain countries. The 
challenges posed for the functioning of the single market by the absorption of migratory 
flows, the UK referendum on the EU and security in the face of the terrorist threat are 
additional sources of uncertainty. 
To ensure the sustainability of the recovery and improve the medium-term outlook, 
economic policy measures on various fronts will be required. As regards monetary policy, 
the stimulus measures adopted by the ECB are allowing the economy’s financing 
conditions to be relaxed and should contribute to quickening the progressive return by 
inflation to rates more compatible with the medium-term objective. Fiscal policy should 
use the headroom afforded it by the Stability and Growth Pact to adopt measures 
promoting activity and boosting medium-term growth. It is also vital to ensure the continuity 
of reform momentum aimed at improving the competitive environment and boosting the 
efficient working of the product and factor markets of those euro area economies departing 
from a position of relative disadvantage in these areas. 
In parallel, the member countries should continue making progress in strengthening the 
institutional framework of EMU. As noted in the June 2015 report “Completing Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union” (known as the Five Presidents’ Report), despite the 
notable headway made, EMU still rests on incomplete institutional architecture. Accordingly, 
it is necessary to continue moving towards greater economic, financial, fiscal and political 
integration. 
The Five Presidents’ Report proposes a series of objectives deemed attainable in the short 
term that would not require amendments to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. Thus, for instance, greater structural convergence is called for, including also more 
efficient labour markets generating better-quality jobs, and better-coordinated euro area 
economic policies. Along these lines, the European Commission has proposed creating 
national agencies entrusted with monitoring competitive imbalances and establishing a 
European Fiscal Council, which will be consultative in nature and should act within the 
multilateral fiscal surveillance framework, providing an independent assessment of the 
application of the Stability and Growth Pact rules by the EC and the EU Council.  Ensuring 
the effectiveness of the new institution will, before its start-up in mid-2016, require that its 
institutional independence be reinforced and that certain aspects of its mandate be 
clarified, such as its role in the assessment of the euro area aggregate fiscal policy stance. 
Likewise, equipping the competitiveness councils with a European dimension would 
3.6  PROGRESS PENDING IN 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
EMU 
The euro area faces a complex 
scenario…
… requiring all economic 
policy strands to pull 
together…
…and resolute progress in 
strengthening the institutional 
framework of EMU
In the short term, mechanisms 
will be needed to achieve 
greater economic policy 
coordination...
23  Law 39/2015 of 1 October 2015 on the Common Administrative Procedure for General Government, Law 
9/2015 of 25 May 2015 on urgent matters in respect of insolvency and Law 25/2015 of 28 July 2015 on the 
second-chance mechanism, reduction of the interest burden and other social measures. Earlier, the bankruptcy 
legislation approved in 2003 had been amended on numerous occasions as a result of the crisis. Specifically, 
there have been changes in the wake of Royal Decree-Law 3/2009, Law 38/2011, Law 14/2013, Royal Decree-
Law 4/2014, and Royal Decree-Law 11/2014.
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provide for greater coordination of structural policies and a more harmonious adjustment 
of the imbalances still in place in the area.
In the short run, a further priority is to consolidate mechanisms allowing for a more efficient 
allocation and greater geographical diversification in terms of the risks assumed by 
financial institutions, so as to improve the area’s ability to absorb potential asymmetric 
shocks. In this respect, the completion of the Banking Union should ensure a level playing 
field for all the member countries’ banking systems, which will require, among other 
instruments, pooled public funds for the resolution of vulnerable institutions once private 
funds have been depleted, and the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme. The EC project for a Capital Markets Union is a further step, with more effective 
regulations, for achieving true financial integration geared to increasing the geographical 
diversification of portfolios and promoting firms’ access to sources of financing other than 
bank lending under competitive conditions.
Beyond the short-term priorities, perseverance will be important for bringing about the 
medium-term objectives identified in the Five Presidents’ Report. Hence, as regards 
Economic Union, structural convergence must eventually be more coercive in nature, 
setting standards or common minimum levels that countries have to meet in areas as 
significant as labour markets and tax systems. Fulfilling these greater economic policy 
demands will provide for the setting in place of common fiscal mechanisms, which will be 
entrusted with macroeconomic stabilisation functions that limit the influence and mitigate 
the economic and social effects of future crises in the area.  
…and to promote financial 
integration, completing the 
Banking Union and boosting 
the Capital Markets Union
In the medium term, more 
resolute progress towards a 
Fiscal Union must be on the 
agenda
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Notable among the more temporary factors underpinning activity 
and employment in 2015 were the additional decline in oil prices 
and the impulse from demand-side policies. These policies 
contributed to sustaining growth last year thanks to the introduction 
by the ECB of fresh monetary stimuli and to a fiscal policy stance 
that turned expansionary following the adoption of certain tax cuts 
and of an increase in consumption and public investment. 
Monetary policy also influenced the depreciation of the euro, 
which exerted an invigorating effect on companies’ sales outside 
the euro area, especially in the first half of the year. Lastly, the fall-
off in the pace of growth of world trade, especially that originating 
in connection with the emerging markets, was a factor that 
operated in the opposite direction and reduced activity. 
Table 1 presents the results of an exercise approximately quantifying 
the effect of the above factors on GDP and inflation in 2015. In this 
connection, the MTBE (Quarterly Macroeconomic Model of the 
Banco de España) is used to simulate the effect that changes that 
were not anticipated in mid-2014 in the monetary policy stance, 
fiscal policy, oil and other commodities prices, and global demand 
have had on the two foregoing variables. Around that juncture, 
there was a fresh fall in oil prices, the ECB decided to adopt various 
additional expansionary measures and the Spanish government 
announced personal income and corporate income tax rate cuts 
for 2015. The model represents the Spanish economy as a small, 
open country integrated into the Monetary Union and, therefore, 
these factors may be incorporated into the model as changes in the 
exogenous conditions that affect the equations explaining the 
behaviour of the different economic agents. 
As analysed in detail in Chapter 3 of this Report, the monetary 
measures improved financial and credit conditions and contributed 
to depreciating the euro and to expanding the activity of our euro 
area trading partners, therefore affecting nominal expenditure. The 
set of discretionary fiscal policy measures has been proxied by the 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary public balance/GDP 
ratio, net of those measures of a temporary nature. In 2015, 
according to this indicator, a fiscal expansion of approximately 1% 
of GDP is estimated, and its effect on the macroeconomic variables 
is obtained by applying the average fiscal multipliers of the MTBE. 
As regards the other two international factors, the fall in 
commodities prices affects the variables of the model not only via 
the reduction in production costs but also via the improvement in 
household disposable income, which boosts consumption and, 
consequently, employment and investment. The intensity of these 
channels depends on the initial level of the oil price which, in this 
simulation, has been set at €70 per barrel, which was the 
international market price prevailing as at mid-2014, compared 
with the average price observed in 2015, of €47 per barrel.1 Lastly, 
the lower growth (down more than 2 pp) of world markets entails a 
decline in activity via the diminished demand for Spanish goods 
and services exports.
Of the four factors that may be considered as exogenous, the new 
monetary policy measures and the cut in the commodities prices 
exerted an estimated impact on GDP in 2015 of 0.6 pp in each 
instance, while the expansionary fiscal policy stance contributed 
around 0.5 pp. Conversely, the lower growth of world markets 
during the year subtracted 0.6 pp from the growth in activity. The 
net effect of the set of factors considered on economic growth last 
year is therefore expected to have been considerable, having 
reached an estimated magnitude of 1.1 pp. Furthermore, the 
lower-than-projected inflation in 2015 was chiefly determined by 
the decline in oil prices, which could only be offset in part by the 
fresh monetary stimuli, meaning that the negative effect, in net 
terms, on inflation was 1.6 pp. 
BOX 1.1A QUANTIFICATION OF THE EFFECT IN 2015 OF THE EXOGENOUS FACTORS ON GROWTH AND INFLATION 
1  For a detailed analysis of the effect that different starting levels of the 
oil price have on the impact of this variable on GDP and inflation, see 
Box 4.2 in Chapter 4 of the Banco de España 2014 Annual Report.
SOURCES: European Commission and Banco de España.
a Simulation using the MTBE. The simulation has taken into account the fact that, around mid-2014, the strong decline in oil and other commodities prices began 
to become discernible. Also, the ECB announced far-reaching monetary policy measures around that time, such as the adoption of negative interest rates in the 
case of the deposit facility.
b In this case the effect has been calculated on the basis of the estimate for the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance in 2015 (-1% according 
to the EC), and its impact on GDP and on inflation, drawing on the MTBE multipliers.
noitalfnIPDG
Monetary policy 6.06.0
Fiscal policy (b) 2.05.0
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Table 1
EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN THE EXOGENOUS ASSUMPTIONS SINCE MID-2014 ON GDP GROWTH AND INFLATION FOR 2015 (a)
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UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE IN SPAIN 
SOURCES: European Commission, INE and Banco de España.
a The regression also includes dummies for the year, quarter and regional government. Marginal effects and the Z statistic (ratio of the coefficient to the standard error) 
are reported. The estimation period spans that from 2005 Q1 to 2015 Q4. The reference category is an unemployed male, aged 35-44, with a higher education and 
unemployed for less than six months.
b This index measures the discrepancy between the distributions by educational attainment level of the employed, or newly employed, and the unemployed. Higher 
levels in the index are interpreted as a greater mismatch between the distribution by educational attainment of the employed and the unemployed and, therefore, 
greater potential difficulties for labour demand needs being covered by the supply of unemployed workers. The index is calculated as It = ∑j = 1 (0j t– Pj t ) 
2, where 0j t 
measures the proportion of employees with educational attainment leve j in the period t and Pj t  measures this same proportion in the case of the unemployed.
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UNEMPLOYMENT AND LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF LONG-TERM AND VERY LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT BY CHARACTERISTIC IN 2015
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The unemployment rate stood in early 2016 at 21%, almost 6 pp 
down on its early-2013 peak, but still far above that observed in 
other European countries. Moreover, the incidence of long-term 
unemployment (over one year unemployed) has diminished only 
slightly, to 60.9% (from its peak of 61.8% in 2014), practically 
threefold the level observed in 2008 (see left-hand panel of Table 
1). Similarly, the proportion of the unemployed without a job for 
over two years has continued to increase, rising to 44.2% in 2015, 
against 9.9% in 2008. This bias in the distribution of unemployment 
towards longer durations is much more marked in Spain than in 
the other European countries, except Greece, and poses an 
additional challenge to continuing along the path of falling 
unemployment.
These developments are  related, at least in part, to the sizable 
educational mismatch that has come about since the onset of 
the crisis between labour supply and demand. This phenomenon 
has chiefly been the consequence of the concentration of 
employment destruction among the least skilled. Indeed, the 
proportion of employees with only a primary education, which 
stood at 18% before the crisis broke, has fallen to 10.2% in 
2015.1 Conversely, the weight of employees with a university 
education has moved on a growing trend, from 23.9% in 2008 to 
29.5% in 2015. As a result, the incidence of lengthy 
unemployment durations is particularly high among groups with 
a lower level of educational attainment, as well as among older 
individuals. In both cases, more than two-thirds of the 
unemployed have been seeking employment for at least a year, 
and more than half have been in that situation for over two years 
(see right-hand panel of Table 1). 
Chart 1 shows an educational mismatch index for the Spanish 
labour market that takes into account the distribution by 
educational attainment of the employed and the unemployed, 
respectively proxying labour demand requirements and the 
average skills of the labour supply available. The index reveals a 
most notable increase since 2007 that has not diminished in the 
recent quarters of greater employment buoyancy, which evidences 
the low employability of certain less skilled groups.2
The analysis of unemployment exit flows shows that the sharp 
decline in the probability of finding a job observed as from 2008, 
from 35% in the years running up to the crisis to a low of 15.2% in 
2013 (see Chart 2), was across the board but more acute in the 
group with the lowest unemployment durations, which were more 
affected by the labour market downturn. Likewise, the pick-up in 
employment creation in the past two years has allowed for a more 
marked increase in unemployment exit rates for durations of less 
than one year, which are already above the level observed in 2009. 
Conversely, the recovery is much more tenuous in the case of 
greater durations. 
Individual information from EPA (Labour Force Survey) records 
enables the determinants of the likelihood of finding a job to be 
estimated (see Table 2). The results of the estimation3 show that 
the youngest and oldest individuals, those least skilled and, above 
all, those having spent most time unemployed show a significantly 
lower probability of finding a job. The effect of the cyclical situation 
in the previous estimation is as expected, whereby higher GDP 
growth translates into a higher unemployment exit rate. However, 
the response of the unemployment exit rate to changes in GDP 
growth depends on unemployment duration. Specifically, it is 
found that a 1% increase in GDP raises the exit rate for durations 
of less than one year by 1.5 pp but by only 0.4 pp in the case of 
durations of over two years.4
If the evolution of these unemployment exit probabilities over 
recent years is analysed5, the crisis can be seen to have reduced 
comparatively more the unemployment exit probability of the 
youngest cohort and, more recently, of those with a lower level of 
educational attainment, among whom a lesser recovery of the exit 
rate is observed in the current upturn. Likewise, a marked 
deterioration is seen in employment opportunities for those with 
longer durations in unemployment. 
In sum, the results presented in this Box reveal the presence of 
certain hysteresis effects that may significantly hamper further 
reductions in unemployment in Spain. This is because, first, 
individuals having been unemployed for the longest periods 
account for a very high proportion of the total unemployed and 
this group also faces growing difficulties in finding a job; and, 
further, the cyclical upturn is exerting a relatively minor impact on 
the job-finding capacity of this group of unemployed workers. 
BOX 1.2
 
UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE IN SPAIN (cont’d) 
1  This effect is partly a consequence of the heavy job losses in the 
construction sector. Box 3.2 of the 2014 Annual Report analysed the 
employment status of construction workers who lost their job at the start 
of the economic crisis in 2008. 
2  See Izquierdo, M., S. Puente and P. Font (2013), “Evolución del desajuste 
educativo entre la oferta y la demanda de trabajo en España”, Boletín 
Económico, Banco de España. June. The course of this index is similar 
when the distribution of recently created employment instead of the total 
stock of employees is used to proxy labour demand needs.
3  Specifically, Table 2 shows the findings of a probit-type model in which, 
for the period running from 2005 de 2015 Q4, an estimate is made of the 
probability of finding an individual employed in a given quarter departing 
from a situation of unemployment in the preceding quarter, drawing on a 
set of aggregate variables and personal characteristics. 
4  These findings are obtained in a version of the foregoing probit model, in 
which the GDP growth coefficient is allowed to differ for each 
unemployment duration. 
5  Based on a probit model like that shown in Table 2 in which the 
coefficients of the different variables are allowed to vary over time.
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BOX 1.3 LOWER STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND HIGHER PRODUCTIVITY AS SOURCES OF POTENTIAL GROWTH 
Various factors point to a considerable reduction in the potential 
growth rate of the Spanish economy in the medium term, which 
could stand at around 1.2% in the 2020-2025 period, compared 
with rates close to 3% over the 2001-2008 period.1 Notable among 
these factors is the impact of population ageing which, on current 
INE forecasts, would lead to a decline in the population of 0.2% per 
annum over the 2020-2025 period2; hence, once this aspect is 
taken into account, per capita potential growth would stand at 
similar rates to those observed during the upturn. The effects of 
population ageing on potential growth will be accentuated, first, by 
the disappearance of the cohort effects that have raised the female 
participation rate in recent decades and which are expected to 
peter out in the coming years.3 The negative contribution of labour 
supply to potential growth may only be offset by a better productivity 
performance, which must overcome its declining trend, or by a 
significant reduction in the structural rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU), beyond what was observed in previous cycles. 
This Box offers different potential growth scenarios for the Spanish 
economy which seek to illustrate the effects of a sustainable 
improvement in the behaviour of productivity and structural 
unemployment, associated, for instance, with the application of 
structural reforms. In the baseline scenario it is assumed that 
these two variables will converge on the average values 
observed in the past two full cycles of the Spanish economy 
(1983-2013). Specifically, assumptions are made for a fall in 
structural unemployment from its current levels to its estimated 
historical average of 14.4%, and a productivity growth path 
consistent with the average of 0.8% observed from 1983 to 2013. 
These figures may be understood as the portion of unemployment 
and potential productivity that is explained by structural 
characteristics of the labour and product markets. 
Hereafter, alternative scenarios are set out considering different 
equilibrium growth paths that reflect the effect of certain structural 
changes in the foregoing variables that would arise, according to 
the assumptions of the exercise, further to the implementation of 
product and labour market reforms. For a reference framework 
within which to analyse the impact of the reforms, the empirical 
evidence available at the international level is used. Specifically, the 
starting point is the regulatory indicators devised by the OECD, 
which measure both the efficiency of the regulatory framework in 
product markets and the legislation on employment protection. 
These indicators seek to quantify various aspects relating to the 
legal and institutional framework in place in each of the countries 
1  The estimates of potential growth strip out the effect of cyclical factors, 
thereby identifying the trend component of economic growth. These 
estimates are based on a production function approach in which the 
productive factors (capital and labour), along with total factor 
productivity, determine the economy’s productive capacity. This 
methodology further allows potential growth scenarios to be devised 
over a medium-/long-term horizon under specific assumptions based on 
the neoclassical growth model (for further details see Cuadrado and 
Moral Benito, “Potential growth of the Spanish economy”, Occasional 
Paper 1603, Banco de España).
2  While the uncertainty surrounding these forecasts may be relatively high, 
the Eurostat forecasts (see EUROPOP 2013) coincide and show a scenario 
of population declines over the medium term in the Spanish economy. 
3  See Montero, J.M. y A. Regil (2015), “La tasa de actividad en España; 
resistencia cíclica, determinantes y perspectivas futuras” Documento 
Ocasional 1502, Banco de España.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The estimates correspond to the average for the period from 2020 to 2025. Scenario 1 considers a reduction in the equilibrium structural unemployment rate 
to 12% in 2025 instead of 14.4% in the baseline scenario. Scenario 2 considers an increase in equilibrium productivity growth to 1.3% in 2025, compared with 
0.8% in the baseline scenario. Scenario 3 incorporates both changes simultaneously.
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Table 1
SCENARIOS FOR POTENTIAL GROWTH IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY IN THE MEDIUM TERM (a)
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LOWER STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND HIGHER PRODUCTIVITY AS SOURCES OF POTENTIAL GROWTH 
(cont’d) 
analysed. Although they are subject to different caveats, these 
measures are usually considered to be a useful tool for assessing the 
relative situation of a country’s regulation and the changes therein 
over time. A lower score in these indicators denotes greater flexibility 
in product and labour markets.4 On the basis of this information, the 
elasticities of the two variables of interest, namely structural 
unemployment and productivity growth, are considered relative to the 
previous indicators. In this connection, the estimates available in the 
literature are used in order to quantify approximately the effect on 
structural unemployment and productivity growth of structural 
reforms that add flexibility to labour and product markets. For Spain’s 
case, it has been considered that a 1 pp reduction in the regulatory 
indicators would involve placing the Spanish regulatory framework at 
the level of the best practices of the OECD countries. Thus, the 
scenarios do not seek to quantify the effects of a specific structural 
reform but to illustrate the potential benefits of setting more efficient 
regulation in place. According to the elasticities available5, an 
improvement in the labour and product market regulatory 
framework on the above scale would reduce the equilibrium 
unemployment rate by 2.4 pp and raise annual productivity growth 
by around 0.5 pp. 
On the basis of these estimates, three scenarios are constructed 
which illustrate the impact of these changes on potential growth in 
the medium term (2020-2025). Scenario 1 considers a 2.4 pp 
reduction in the equilibrium structural unemployment rate (to 12% 
in 2025), scenario 2 illustrates the 0.5 pp increase in equilibrium 
productivity growth (to 1.3% at the end of the period considered) 
and, finally, scenario 3 incorporates the effects of the changes in 
both variables simultaneously. 
Table 1 shows the results of these scenarios for the 2020-2025 
period. The scenario based on higher annual growth rates in 
productivity results in higher potential growth than the scenario 
that includes a more marked reduction in the structural 
unemployment rate, which partly reflects higher growth in the 
volume of capital given the higher growth of productivity.6 In any 
event, when both types of reforms combine, potential growth 
would stand at rates close to 2%, exceeding the per capita growth 
observed in the upturn. 
These simulations thus illustrate the importance of pushing 
through structural reforms that increase productivity growth and 
reduce the structural unemployment rate in order to offset the 
impact of population ageing and the tailing off of the expansion in 
the female participation rate recorded in recent decades. 
4  For example, the indicator of legislation on employment protection takes 
into account, inter alia, the amount of severance payments, the definition 
of unfair dismissal, the conditions for the use of temporary contracts and 
the different procedures applicable, while the product market regulation 
indicator encompasses concepts such as public sector intervention in 
private operations, regulatory complexity, explicit obstacles to trade and 
investment, and freedom of opening hours. For further details on product 
market regulation indicators, see Mora-Sanguinetti, J.S and M. 
Martínez-Matute (2014), “La regulación en el mercado de productos en 
España según los indicadores de la OCDE”. Boletín Económico Banco de 
España 12, pp. 45 54. Regarding the employment protection legislation 
indicator, see OECD (2013), “Protecting Jobs, enhancing flexibility: A new 
look at employment protection legislation”. OECD Employment Outlook.
5  See Bassanini, A. and R. Duval (2009), “Unemployment, institutions and 
reform complementarities: re-assessing the aggregate evidence for OECD 
countries”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy; Nicoletti, G. and S. Scarpetta 
(2003), “Regulation, productivity and growth: OECD evidence”, Economic 
Policy; and Bassanini, A., L. Nunziata and D. Venn (2009), “Job protection 
legislation and productivity growth in OECD countries”, Economic Policy.
6  In the neoclassical growth model considered in this Box, the growth of 
capital per employee is assumed, under equilibrium, to be equal to 
technological growth.
